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he definition of cost in the economic 
literature is highly standardized: the cost of 
X is defined as the value of the most valuable 
alternative that had to be forsaken in order to 
obtain X.1 Let us suppose that to get X you had 
to abandon the alternatives Y, Z, and W. To 
decide which of these is the most valuable, you 
must of course calculate the benefits they each 
involve, and presumably these must be net 
benefits—you would hardly want to say that the 
value of alternative Z was a million dollars if it 
costs $999,000 to get it. To calculate net 
benefits, you must be able to calculate not only 
the actual benefits but the actual costs involved 
in getting them. In other words, this definition 
of costs essentially involves understanding the 
concept of cost, so the definition is circular, a 
fatal logical flaw.2 
The second problem is even more 
fundamental. This definition of cost equates cost 
with (the maximum) opportunity cost; but the two 
concepts are not identical, although related. The 
key difference is that some costs are not oppor-
tunity costs at all. To understand this, it is 
helpful to consider a commonsensical case 
where the difference is more obvious than in 
the typical case economists consider in their 
professional role. In the practical problem of 
when to recommend surgery for an elderly 
                                                
1 For example, see Levin, H. & McEwan, J. (2001). Cost-
effectiveness analysis (2nd ed., pp. 43-45). Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage. (Levin is an economist by training.). 
2 For more details on this point, see my essay “Costs in 
evaluation: Concept and practice” in Alkin & Solomon 
(Eds.). (1983). Evaluation costs: Concept and theory. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
patient with prostate cancer, one has to weigh 
the life expectancy with and without the 
operation, and the quality of life during those 
periods, plus the direct costs of the operation, 
which include not only the money cost but the 
pre-operative anxiety and the post-operative 
pain, and of course the pain involved as the 
cancer develops if it is not removed.   
Now, what do we mean by saying that one 
of the costs of the operation is the pain it 
involves? The commonsensical answer is that 
we all know what a pain is, slight or severe, just 
as we know what a pleasure is—by direct 
experience. That is, some costs (and some 
benefits) are a simple matter of direct 
experience, like colors or affection. But the 
economist’s definition of cost in this case would 
lead to the view that the cost of pain is the value 
of the most valuable alternative to it that was 
forsaken; which in this case is the state of 
absence of pain. That is, pain cost = value of 
being free of pain. Now, what is the difference 
between the cost of slight pain and the cost of 
extremely severe pain? The left hand side of the 
equality is obviously very different, but the right 
hand side is the same, because you don’t forsake 
a different alternative in the two cases. So the 
cost of slight pain is the same, on this 
definition, as the cost of severe pain, which is 
clearly absurd. The economist’s definition of 
cost is totally insensitive to major differences in 
true cost.   
We need to remind ourselves here of the 
commonsensical notion of cost, according to 
which costs are simply the bad (i.e., disvalued) 
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things that go along with acquiring or changing 
things or having things happen to you. They are 
the negative accompaniments of changes in the 
situation or condition of the agent, just as 
benefits are the good (i.e., valued) 
accompaniments. And ‘opportunity costs’ are 
the other changes that could have occurred or 
been achieved with about the same bad 
concomitants. The two are thus essentially 
distinct—one being a set of disvalues, the other 
being a set of choices or changes.   
Now definitions are claims about the identity 
of two things. But costs and opportunity costs 
are two completely different kinds of things. 
There is only a metaphorical sense in which 
opportunity costs are a kind of cost—because 
they are foregone options (in some cases), there 
is a metaphorical sense in which they are like 
money spent and some other costs that involve 
giving up things you previously had, like leisure 
time. But the sense in which you have options is 
not the same as the sense in which you have 
money or a pain-free life; so the sense in which 
you lose options is not the same as the sense in 
which you lose a pain-free life. Is experience pain. 
It’s true that we sometimes talk of costs as the 
sacrifices we make in order to get something we 
want, and sacrifices include lost options. But 
those costs, all those other options we forego, 
are extremely unlike pain and some other 
directly experienced costs, so they cannot 
possibly be treated as the true meaning of costs. 
Opportunity costs are an entirely different 
breed of cat from literal costs. Economists 
realize this when they take care not to add 
opportunity costs to other costs in order to get 
total costs; they forget it when they define one 
in terms of the other. Of course, the truth also 
emerges when one reflects that in truth all the 
opportunity costs are foregone when something 
is selected, hence—if opportunity costs were 
even additive in their own domain—the 
opportunity costs of any decision is always 
infinite. This oddity is avoided by defining cost 
as the most valuable of the missed opportunities; 
but that move runs into the circularity problem 
already identified. Perhaps the best way of 
thinking about opportunity costs is as set of 
perspectives on the true cost of something, as 
ways of seeing what that cost really means to 
you. As such, they are often very important in 
appraising true value or worth; but, like 
alternative perspectives on the benefits of an 
evaluand, they are not one of the costs or 
benefits.   
It may be that the cause of this confusion is 
partly the difference between things we choose, or 
plan to do, and their costs; and things that happen to 
us, us, or are done to us and their costs to us. 
Things that happen to us, like tsunamis or 
surgical operations, are likely to have directly 
experienced costs such as the loss of our homes 
or family, and pain, which are not lost options 
but simply bad outcomes or tolls taken on us. 
Things that we consider or might consider 
doing, the sort of thing that economists are 
called in to cost, do have opportunity costs, and 
make it seem plausible to define all costs as 
opportunity costs. But they are only half of the 
world of costs, and that definition is absurd in 
the other half of experience.   
Could one not argue that the economist is 
simply defining a construct that is useful in the 
science of economics, not the one in everyday 
language? Sure, as long as the economist 
explicitly abandons any claim to be analyzing 
the real costs that we have to consider in 
making decisions that affect real people. But 
economists don’t want to do that; they want to 
eat their cake and have it too. That’s 
intellectually greedy, and it’s misleading 
advertising that seriously misleads those hoping 
for advice with real-world problems; especially 
since the economist has a perfectly good term 
already for dealing with what they are analyzing, 
namely ‘opportunity costs.’   
Evaluators should not follow the 
economists here, or they will end up in a swamp 
of misleading conclusions about program costs, 
e.g., by underweighting the directly experienced 
costs of loss of habitat to native people of the 
forests, tundra, or plains. No technician’s 
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definition can magically equate those losses to 
the money they may (or may not) have agreed 
to accept in exchange. You may sell your soul 
for money, but that does not make a soul the 
same kind of thing as money, except (perhaps) 
to an economist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
